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FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM:
A REPLY TO GALE
John Martin Fischer

Richard Gale contends that my arguments against the "Ockhamist" reply to
the argument for the incompatibility of Cod's foreknowledge and human
freedom depend on problematic inferences involving the notion of "bringing about" a proposition. I point out that my arguments do not rest on such
inferences, and I seek to clarify what I take to be the basic thrust of the argument for incompatibilism. This argument does not rest on the impossiblity
of backward causation, but the implausibility of supposing that we can
have it in our power so to act that the past would have been different from
what it actually was.

In his probing and suggestive piece, "Divine Omniscience, Human
Freedom, and Backward Causation," Richard Gale raises many intriguing
issues; in the brief space allotted to me here, I can only address a few points
(and in a somewhat schematic way). Gale lays out a version of an important argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human
freedom (in the sense that involves alternative possibilities). He then contends that my arguments against the "Ockhamist" reply to this basic argument are unconvincing insofar as they rely on certain allegedly problematic
inferences involving the notion of "bringing about" a proposition.
On Gale's interpretation, the Ockhamist allows for an agent (sometimes)
to bring it about that God held a different belief from the one He actually
held, since to do so is simply to bring about a temporally impure proposition about the past. Gale claims that I have argued that in the context of
God's prior beliefs, to bring about an impure proposition about the past
implies that one bring about a pure proposition about the past, which is
ruled out on the Ockhamist's own assumptions. Further, Gale suggests a
characterization of the problematic distinction between temporally pure
and impure propositions, to which he refers in laying out the alleged structure of my argument against Ockhamism.
For example, Gale claims that J argue that if an agent can bring it about
that God believed at tl that p (a temporally impure proposition, insofar as p
is assumed to pertain to the future relative to tl), then he can bring it about
that someone believed at tl that p (a temporally pure proposition). Here
Gale supposes that my inference depends on a principle expressing the closure of "brings it about that _" under deduction. Additionally, Gale imagines that God is Bob's favorite object. Now if an agent can bring it about
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 19 No.1 January 2002
All rights reserved

89

90

Faith and Philosophy

that God believed at tl that p, then this agent can bring it about that Bob's
favorite object believed at tl that p (a temporally pure proposition). Gale
supposes that my inference here depends on a principle stating that "coreporting propositions are inter-substitutable salve veritate," and thus are so
inter-substitutable within the context of "brings it about that_fl.
Finally, Gale points out that I assume (for the sake of my argument) that
God's believing that p involves God's mind being in a representational state
S. He points out that I argue that if an agent can bring it about that God
believes at tl that p, then the agent can bring it about that God's mind is in
representational state S at tl. Gale states that God's mind's being at tl in
representational state S is a pure proposition (relative to tl). Again, he contends that my inference depends on a principle of closure of "brings it about
that _", where the closure here pertains to co-reporting propositions.
In the above cases, Gale rejects the allegedly problematic results by
rejecting the inferences; he contends that "brings it about that _" is an
opaque context, and thus the inferences in question are invalid. In reply I
would first point out that 1 do not consider the results mentioned by Gale
genuinely problematic for the Ockhamist. This is because I do not believe
that the relevant propositions (such as the proposition that someone
believes at t1 that p) are genuinely temporally pure (in the relevant contexts). This calls into question Gale's account of the distinction between
pure and impure propositions, to the extent that his account seems to
imply that at least his first two putatively problematic propositions are
pure. Further, I shall point out that my pattern of argumentation against
Ockhamism does not need to employ any sort of problematic inference
concerning "bringing it about that _"; for example, the argument can be
developed simply employing facts about the relationship between counterfactuals and "can-claims" (claims about the relevant sort of freedom).
Suppose that an agent can bring it about that God believed at tl that p.
Does it follow that this agent can bring it about that someone believed at tl
that p? It is not obvious, since there may be others who so believed at tl,
and the mere fact that the agent can perform an action sufficient for the
obtaining of some proposition cannot imply that the agent can bring about
that proposition, on Gale's own account. (After all, Gale says, "If brings it
about that _' were closed under deduction, it would follow that, since a
necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition, 1 can bring it about
that 2+2=4 if I can bring it about that any proposition is true," a fact Gale
takes to be a reductio of the closure claim.)
But grant that (in a certain context) the agent can indeed bring it about
that someone believed at t1 that p by bringing it about that God so
believed. My view is that this is no problem for the Ockhamist, since in the
circumstances the someone in question is God. That is, in the relevant context, "Someone believed at tl that p" is indeed a temporally impure proposition, because it is made true by God's so believing. Any account of the
temporally pure/impure distinction that does not capture this intuition
(such as Gale's) is inadequate. ' A similar point applies to "Bob's favorite
object believed at t1 that p." Thus far, in my view, there is no problem for
Ockhamism, nor any problem for the relevant inference principles involving "brings it about that _".
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Note that I distinguish between two conceptions of "God." If "God" is
taken to be a role term, and "Yahweh" names the individual who actually-but not necessarily-occupies this role, then I claim that "God believed
at t1 that p" is a "hard-core soft fact."2 Put in Gale's framework, this
implies that in the relevant sort of context, if an agent can perform an act
which is such that if he were to perform it, God would have believed at n
that p, then the agent can perform an act which is such that if he were to
perform it, Yahweh would have believed at n that p. In the relevant context, then, the agent would be so acting that some genuinely pure proposition (about the past) would have obtained.
So suppose that p states the actual truth about how an agent will behave
at a time subsequent to n. If the agent nevertheless can do otherwise, then
he can perform some action which is such that if he were to perform it,
Yahweh would not have believed at t1 that p. The above is enough to generate my argument; the only resources I use are facts about counterfactuals
and their relationship to "can-claims," and not inferences involving "brings
it about that _". The basic intuition that drives my argument here is that
no one has it in his power at a given time t so to act that some temporally
pure fact about a time prior to t which actually obtained would not have
obtained.' (If, on the other hand, "God" is taken to be a name of an individual who essentially has the Divine Attributes, then I claim that "God
believed at t1 that p" is a "hard-type soft fact."4 I will explain this in what
follows, as it applies to Gale's argument about my conception of God's
beliefs as involving representational states.)
Gale points out that my argument assumes what he calls the "quite
dubious" proposition that Cod cannot have a belief unless his mind is in
some sort of representational state. I grant that this assumption is contentious. I would suggest however that this assumption specifies a significant way in which Cod's beliefs and human beliefs might be thought to be
similar; when one gives it up, one at least moves toward a notion of Divine
belief that is so different from human belief as (arguably) to involve a different sense. And one of Nelson Pike's main contentions was that his argument showed the incompatibility of God's prior beliefs and human free
action, where God is said to have beliefs in the same sense as humans."
Gale says that I claim that if God's believing at t1 that p is identical with
Cod's mind at t1 being in representational state 5, then if an agent can
bring it about that God believed at t1 that p, then the agent can bring it
about that Cod's mind at t1 is in S. Gale further claims that this latter fact
is temporally pure.
I do not know why Gale supposes that the proposition that God's mind
at t1 is in a representational state S (a state that represents the world as
being such as to render p true) is temporally pure. It would seem that both
intuitively and on his own criterion, this would tum out to be a temporally
impure fact, on the assumption that "God" is the name of an individual
who possesses the Divine Attributes essentially. (Absent this assumption,
even the proposition that God believed at t1 that p would tum out to be
pure.) So as yet there is no problem for Ockhamism.
The problem comes from noting that in the relevant sort of context, if an
agent can perform an act which is such that if he were to perform it, God

92

Faith and Philosophy

would believe at tl that p, then the agent can perform an act which is such
that if he were to perform it, God would at tl have the property, "believing
that p." Further, it is my contention that this property is a "temporally
pure" property. That is, I make a distinction between properties that is parallel to the temporally pure/impure distinction among propositions. 6 So in
the relevant sort of context, an agent's so acting that God believed at tl that
p would require his so acting that God had some temporally pure property
at tl. And, as above, if an agent can (at some time subsequent to tl) do
other than he aChIally does, then he can perform some action which is such
that if he were to perform it, God would have had a different temporally
pure property at tl from what he actually had. Again, this is all I need for
my argument against Ockhamism (on the current assumption about
"God"). The argument is generated by facts about counterfactuals and
their relationships to "can-claims," together with the distinction between
pure and impure properties. The basic intuition that drives my argument
here is that no one has it in his power at a given time t so to act that some
individual would have had at a time prior to t some temporally pure property that he did not actually have.
An important point that comes out of the above discussion is that the
argument for incompatibilism, as I interpret it, does not in the first instance
exploit the impossibility of backward causation. It was perhaps unfortunate that Pike employed the locution, "brings it about that _," which can
seem to suggest backward causation, where the relevant proposition is
about the past. Rather, the argument, properly interpreted, exploits the
fact that no agent can so act that the past would have been different from
the way it actually was; that is, no agent can perform an act which is such
that, if he were to perform it, the past would have been different from the
way it aChlally was. If the (relevant) backtracking counterfactual is true,
then the associated "can-claim" must be false. Thus a proponent of the
argument need not be committed to what Gale takes to be problematic
inference rules concerning "brings it about that _ n .

University of California
NOTES
1. Further, any account of the distinction which can do the work it needs
to do in the arguments concerning the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human freedom must capture the notion of how a more abstract
proposition (such as one involving quantification) is made true.
2. John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control
(Oxford, u.K. and Cambridge, Ma.: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 115-117.
3. For a full development of the argument, see John Martin Fischer,
"Scotism," Mind 94 (1985), pp. 231-43; and The Metaphysics of Free Will, esp. p.
63.
4. Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, pp. 117-128.
5. Nelson Pike, "Of God and Freedom: A Rejoinder," Philosophical Review
75 (1966), pp. 369-379. I do not claim that it is obvious that sameness of sense
of belief between God and human beings requires the assumption. Note, however, that if one gives up the assumption in the text and accepts some sort of
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"direct apprehension model" of God's knowledge, then one must countenance
pervasive backward causation; for a discussion of this point, see John Martin
Fischer, "Critical Notice of Jordan Howard Sobel, Puzzles for the Will (forthcoming), Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
6. For an attempt at giving an account of this distinction, see John Martin
Fischer, "Hard-Type Soft Facts," Philosophical Review 95 (1986), pp. 591-60l.
There are critical discussions in : David Widerker, "Two Forms of Fatalism," in
J.M. Fischer, ed., God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1989), pp. 97-110; and "Troubles With Ockhamism," Journal of Philosophy
87 (1990), pp. 462-80. For a response to Widerker, including an improved specification of the distinction, see John Martin Fischer, "Hard Properties," Faith
and Philosophy 10 (1993), pp. 161-9.

